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This paper describes the need for and content of an emerging paradigm termed Social 
Ecological Economics (SEE). In this paper we argue that SEE is the essential future direction 
for the economics profession, not least because of the social-ecological crises facing 
humanity and the need for transformation of capital accumulating economic systems. 
Economics as a discipline is a failure because of a long running inability to address, and 
tendency to marginalise, such things as power relations, social inequities and injustice 
(across gender, class and race), ethical social provisioning, the role of care and reproductive 
processes, the social implications of advancing technology, treatment of others with silent 
voices (e.g. future generations, children, the non-human world).  
 
SEE draws upon a wide range of literature with links to classical political economy and critical 
institutional economics. It relates environmental problems to economic structure via the work 
of Kapp (1950) on social costs and cost shifting, and Georgescu-Roegen (1971) on 
thermodynamics and dialectics, and connects to ecology to identify mechanism arising from 
ecosystem structure and function (Spash and Smith, 2019). These are common roots with 
some branches of ecological economics, but the fundamental difference is the emphasis 
placed on social structure. In this respect SEE shares concerns with feminist economics over 
care, reproduction and the role of unrecognised labour, and Marxist political theory over 
power, class and exploitation. The need is recognised for a social theory as well as a 
philosophy of science, neither of which have been adequately addressed by ecological 
economics. 
 
The philosophical basis of the approach is argued to be closest to critical realism. Core 
aspects of correspondence here are depth ontology raising the profile of both structure and 
mechanisms as opposed to a sole focus on empirical facts. Structure as a metaphysical 
reality with multiple causal mechanisms operating in open systems then poses challenges for 
how economics conducts itself as a science.  While following critical realism in its epistemic 
pluralism there is also a recognised need for structuring interdisciplinary research and uniting 
diverse fields via common ontological understanding leading to a structured methodological 
pluralism (not the eclecticism of constructionism and conventionalism). Potential methods for 
research are selected on the basis of the qualities of an object of study and research question 
and as such remain open and diverse (quantitative/qualitative, intensive/extensive, see Sayer, 
2010). Economic science is then neither deductivist, empiricist nor reducible to a set of 
idealised methods. 
 
We start this explanation of SEE by taking issue with the hegemonic definition of economics 
based on choice and offer an alternative based on social provisioning.  This clarifies the 
failure of economics to address different forms of economies both in theory and as actualised 
and operational both historically and at present. The relationship of economies to needs and 
their satisfaction with an associated material and energy throughput then becomes part of 
economic analysis. As noted, a clarified relationship between the ecological economic and the 
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social is required and we explain some basic aspects of the relationship to social reality.  This 
coverage is an outline of the ontological commitments of SEE, that is how reality is 
understood, its key constituents as far as an social-ecological economic system is concerned 
and some of their relationships.  Next we outline the way in which economics can be 
conducted from the perspective of two other aspects of philosophy of science, namely 
epistemology and methodology. 
 
 
II. Economics as the study of social provisioning 
 
A rather obvious approach to defining what constitutes economics as a subject is to 
determine its primary object of study. Economics as an orthodoxy has for some time been 
dominated by a neo-Austrian dogma that was introduced significantly via Lionel Robbins 
(1932) and adopted into the mainstream, not least in microeconomic theory.  This placed the 
concepts of resource scarcity and individual choice at the centre of a liberal political economy 
that was supposedly value free. The economic problem became meeting unlimited and 
competing wants and the supposed solution was meant to be resource allocation via “the 
market”, soon supplemented by (macro-)economic growth. In fact a single institutional 
process associated with capitalism was being advocated, namely, what Karl Polanyi (1957) 
termed, the price-making market. Robbins neo-Austrian definition then merged into Chicago 
school neoliberalism, where choice in a market setting, subject to price incentives, became 
the essence of economics and this has since permeated its meaning. This approach 
permitted an imperialistic expansion of economics into all sorts of subject areas, simply based 
on the idea that humans must make decisions as individuals so that any decision became an 
economic topic, e.g. equating everything from buying a cup of coffee to suicide (as infamously 
proposed by Becker, 1976). 
 
In stark contrast, an older tradition regards the core of economics as determining the social 
and institutional arrangements for providing the needs of a community (or nation). Here the 
aim is to achieve a common good or well-being of all. What constitutes the good/well-being 
for a group then requires explicit ethical judgment. Modern times reduced the goal of seeking 
the “common weal” (i.e., the ability to fare well, prosper and have good fortune) into 
accumulating wealth and making money. Economics then simply became the study of capital 
accumulation using money and market prices and ultimately leading to economists’ claims of 
being able to determine optimally efficient public policy. 
 
SEE immediately takes issue with reducing the subject down to studying something as 
singular as the economy, as if there were only one such entity or form. The term “the 
economy” is merely unthinking code for market capitalism, while denying actualised varieties 
of capitalism and that this is only one form of economic system (Hodgson, 2016). So rather 
than reduce economics to the study of one generic form meant to approximate the currently 
dominant system, a far broader approach is required, and not least so because this system is 
failing and creating catastrophic social and ecological crises. 
 
A more comprehensive approach is to define economics as the study of social provisioning to 
meet human needs within an ethical framework of care and justice for others, both human 
and non-human. Social provisioning is a necessary activity for any social group whether a 
household, village, town, city, region, nation state or global collective. It concerns the ways in 
which people organise as social groupings to satisfy their needs. Markets as mechanisms for 
allocation are merely one form of arrangement and themselves diverse in structure. 
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Economics can then be seen as concerned with the variety of institutions for ensuring the 
satisfaction of needs and the reproduction of a society. Institutions here are to be understood 
as inclusive of conventions, norms, rules and regulations (Vatn, 2005). This immediately 
opens up economics for the consideration of alternatives and potentialities rather than the 
nihilistic claim that there are no alternatives. 
 
A common objection to a focus on needs is that this is deterministic and fails to allow for the 
variety that appears evident in human society. Such a claim can be seen as confusing 
objective requirements with subjective means of their fulfilment. Thus Max-Neef (2009 [1992]) 
makes the distinction between needs and the satisfiers that enable their actualisation. He 
identifies nine fundamental needs – subsistence, affection, understanding, participation, 
leisure, creation, identity, freedom – that are regarded as universal and only changeable over 
extremely long time periods of species evolution (Max-Neef, 2009[1992]: 138). Meeting needs 
is regarded as a necessary prerequisite for human flourishing, while their means of fulfilment 
is socially contextual and varies across space and time (Rauschmayer and Omann, 2017). 
Satisfiers relate to the institutions, norms and practices that structure the satisfaction of 
needs, and will influence how economic goods and services contribute to their fulfilment or 
inhibition (Max-Neef, 1992). As such, while needs remain objective, how they are expressed, 
perceived, and fulfilled will always be subjective, conditioned by institutional arrangements 
and wider social and cultural contexts. This embeddedness and emergence of an economy 
from and with social structure forms one of the foundational ontological commitments of SEE. 
 
In turn, social and economic systems are understood as being embedded in, and 
fundamentally constrained by, biophysical structures (Spash, 2017; Spash and Smith, 2019). 
All economic processes interact with their environment. There is a straight forward and basic 
dependency of economic systems upon flows of materials and energy as well as sinks for the 
necessary removal of waste material and energy. Economies are open social-ecological 
systems. Their processes operate within a set of limits prescribed by ecosystems structure 
and functioning, and social structure represented by actors and their institutional context. 
 
 
III. The biophysical in economics 
 
A basic fact, although absent from most economic thinking, is that natural resources and 
waste sinks are required to ensure social provisioning. The reproduction of societies must 
address the maintenance of ecosystems structure and their functioning or fail. Production 
fundamentally requires energy, or, more precisely, available energy termed “exergy”. That is, 
humans require energy capable of performing useful “work”, which is defined, as in physics, 
to mean the exertion of a force against some form of resistance (Ayres and Warr, 2009). Such 
work can be performed by humans, animals or machines, but will always require some input 
of exergy, whether it is the solar radiation embodied in food that fuels human and animal 
labour, or fossil fuels to power a heat engine. This dependency of societies on flows of energy 
and materials is captured in the concept of “social metabolism” (Krausmann, 2017). There is 
no single social metabolism because it will vary depending upon the structure of an economy 
and its social provisioning mechanisms, and there-in lies the potential of alternative social-
ecological economies. 
 
The metabolic nature of human societies emphasises the role of materials and energy in their 
reproduction. This make the laws of thermodynamics central to any economic process as 
explored by Georgescu-Roegen (1971). The first law of thermodynamics stipulates that 
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energy is neither created nor destroyed but transformed from one state to another. In turn, the 
second law states that when used, available energy dissipates and becomes less useful. This 
is a qualitative and irreversible process, which implies that exergy is bound to diminish, while 
entropy, as a measure of energy dissipation, or disorder, will inevitably increase in an isolated 
system (i.e. where there is neither exchange of energy nor materials with any other system). 
 
Human, and non-human, survival depends upon material and energy exchange which means 
on being open systems. Giampietro (2019) notes how Schrödinger described living organisms 
and ecosystems as having the capacity to seemingly avoid, or even reverse, entropic decay 
through interaction with their surroundings but this requires gathering available energy and 
concentrated materials from, and disposing of waste into, other systems. Entropy is not 
actually reversed because it continues in the larger system with which living organisms 
interact and are dependent. As biophysical entities living organisms are open systems. In 
general, open systems can maintain organisation, a given size and level of activity, but this 
has consequences for the systems with which they must interact. The growth of any 
organism, ecosystem or population is therefore fundamentally limited by the biophysical 
structure of its environment. These are termed horizontal limits by Devictor (2017: 120-121), 
because they relate to the spatial-temporal boundary for a given population, assemblage or 
ecosystem. The same principle applies to human societies and their economies, which 
depend upon ecosystems for flows of materials and energy as well as sinks for the waste they 
generate. Giampietro (2019) remarks that this implies that the processes ensuring the 
reproduction of elements of a “technosphere” (i.e. a social economy) must not interfere with 
the reproduction of elements in its associated “biosphere” (i.e. ecosystems structure and 
function) upon which they depend for maintaining a given scale of activity and organisation. 
Different societies have attempted to address this requirement in different ways with varying 
degrees of success in sustaining themselves. 
 
Human history consists of a long period in which social provisioning was organised by free 
roaming, migratory, hunter gatherers prior to the rise of sedentary agricultural settlements. 
The former appear highly sustainable, long lived and relatively low impact, although some 
extinction of species is implicated. The latter consisted of small bioregional economies, with 
regional material flows and solar radiation as the main source of exergy, reliant on agriculture 
and forestry for various reproductive processes. The industrial revolution marked the start of a 
major transformation of social metabolism in human social and economic systems. The use of 
fossil fuels – coal then gas then oil – became the main source of exergy driving production 
processes, while increasing use of concentrated minerals replaced solar dependent plant and 
animal materials. This expansion of production, along with the development of artificial 
fertilizers, facilitated the growth of economic activities and populations beyond their previous 
limits (Spash, 2017). 
 
This social metabolism appears highly unsustainable. After a few hundred years operating in 
just parts of the global provisioning system the results appear headed towards catastrophic 
collapse. The move away from exergy derived from solar radiation to finite stocks of 
concentrated minerals, combined with economic growth, has meant the social metabolism of 
industrialised human societies rapidly depleted the “entropic dowry” upon which it depends 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). As a physically closed system, the Earth exchanges flows of 
energy but not of materials with its surrounding (at least not in any significant sense), while 
the reproduction of biospheric entities is made possible by the existence of various climatic 
systems that dispose of thermal energy into outer space, maintaining favourable conditions 
for life (Mayumi, 2017). Once used the stocks of low entropy are in effect irreversibly lost. In 
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theory, the flows of exergy from solar radiation could be harnessed to reverse the dispersal of 
available energy on Earth, but to date this remains science fiction, while the ability to 
reconcentrate all dissipated materials to original quality on a substantive scale appears 
equally implausible (Spash and Smith, 2019). Recognising the biophysical reality of the 
economic process then leads to the inevitable conclusion that industrial economies are 
dependent on finite stocks exergy and their continued operation, let alone continual growth, is 
impossible over any extended period of time. 
 
While the exhaustion of finite resources remains an ultimate limit on human activity, an 
arguably more pressing limit is the accumulation of waste. Industrial social metabolism 
“merely transforms low entropy into waste” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). As such, pollution 
should not be treated as a problem outside the system (i.e. an externality), or an anomaly, 
that could somehow be solved through increased efficiency, or correcting prices, but as an 
integral part of the economic process (Spash, 2021b). The Laws of Conservation indicate the 
inevitability of pollution because mass remains the same, but the quality of materials, like 
energy, declines. Ecological economists such as Daly (1992) have emphasised the scale of 
impacts from human activity (e.g. waste accumulation). What has been given less attention is 
the qualitative aspect arising due to the creation of artificial substances and interventions that 
would not have otherwise occurred and to which natural systems and entities are unable to 
adjust. Such unnatural impacts on the biosphere and ecosystems lie at the heart of the 
ecological crisis, such as the on-going mass extinction of species. Thus, not just the scale of 
human activity (e.g. quantity of waste, population size) but also its qualities determine the 
consequences for the environment and functioning of ecosystems. The importance of the 
form of intervention is why technology is never neutral, and also what determines the extent 
to which something is unnatural (Deckers, 2021). Humans are then engaged in processes of 
change not equilibrium and stability. 
 
The development of ecology in the 1970s brought new insights into the structure of complex 
systems and their interconnections. This was mainly driven by the realisation of the disruptive 
impact of human activities on ecosystems’ structure and function, which in turn affected 
human systems (Spash and Smith, 2019). Contrary to previous views of ecosystems as 
isolated, self-regulating and stable systems, they became recognised as complex and 
dynamic open systems. The potentiality to change ecosystem structure dramatically following 
systems collapse was highlighted by Holling (2009[1986]), who described this organisation 
and reorganisation process as part of a cyclical pattern. The evolution of an ecosystem or 
population can be chaotic with abrupt changes in trajectory. Besides the “horizontal limits”, 
mentioned earlier, “vertical limits” are emergent and arise due to interactions between 
ecological levels and dependencies between different components of the system (Devictor 
2017). Human activities interacting with ecosystems have uncertain and indeterminate 
consequences for their structure and function. In the face of such partial ignorance and 
indeterminacy over human intervention, public policy would better be precautionary than risk 
taking (Stirling, 2017), and society prepared to adapt rather than lock itself in to a specific 
“optimal” pathway (e.g. infrastructure, technologies, energy and materials). 
 
 
IV. The social dimension of economics 
 
Social reality is the dynamic outcome of human practices from which it emerges and by which 
it is reproduced (Lawson, 2006). However, emergence means that social structure while 
dependent upon is not reducible to human practices (e.g. individual behaviour).  Social 
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structure enables coordinated interactions through collective practices. Collective practices 
refer to accepted ways of doing things in a community, and can emerge in various ways, 
notably because of their functionality, but also simply by chance or repeated occurrences 
(Lawson 2012). They form a basis for individuals to form expectations as to the appropriate 
course of actions to follow in order to coordinate with others. Interconnected obligations and 
rights may evolve that are relationally constituted  and constitutive of social positions (Lawson 
2006). For example, the positions of employer and employee exist in relation to each other 
and entail associated rights and obligations for both parties. 
 
How, and to what degree the actions of agents are pre-determined by social structure, as 
opposed to being autonomous, is a fundamental point of debate. Mainstream economics 
reduces “society” to being an aggregation of individuals who act purely out of individual self-
interest (i.e. maximising their own personal utility) and are basically identical (both ethically 
and psychologically). As such it cannot explain the historical variety in social provisioning 
systems – production and consumption patterns – throughout history and across 
contemporary cultures. This requires understanding human variety and social relations as 
emergent and mediated through institutions and values that interact with, shape and form 
economic structures. Human action is always relative to a particular context in space and time 
and set within social structure. While agency is restricted it is neither denied nor entirely pre-
determined. 
 
Following Jessop’s (2001, 2005, 2007) “strategic-relational” approach, structure and agency 
can be viewed as dialectical concepts beyond an artificial dualism. He considers structures as 
strategically selective, but not absolutely constraining, leaving some room for agency. His 
main argument is that structures generally tend to favour some actions over others. In this 
sense, he emphasize the importance of a strategic context for action: agents will strategically 
reflect on their (usually incomplete) understanding of structural constraints and opportunities 
and act accordingly. Action is therefore both structured, and “structuring” as it tends to 
reproduce structures and their patterns of strategic selectivity. These recursive interactions 
between agency and structure create tendencies because structures are not absolutely 
constraining. There is then only relative and temporary stability to patterns of strategic 
selectivity, with the possibility for actions to circumvent structural constraints or change them. 
 
As structures are the product of human agency, they are dynamic and are open to change 
(Lawson, 2012). Through their practices and interactions, humans continuously (and often 
unintentionally) reproduce and transform the social structures that influence these practices. 
The employer-employee relation for example has evolved, with a changing set of rights and 
obligations as unions have negotiated better working conditions. Likewise, the social 
positioning of women has changed as emancipatory movements have fought for equal rights 
as citizens. 
 
That major social structures can change (if generally only slowly) is evident from the contrast 
between modern society and archaic societies. For example, Sahlins (1972) described how  
hunter-gatherer economies were characterised by a high degree of underproduction and 
disdain towards accumulating material possessions. Modern industrialised societies promote 
over production and waste in a throwaway, fashion conscious mode of conspicuous 
consumption. Thus, modern consumer behaviour is not an ahistorical trait of human nature, 
but a specific form of social structure which helps reproduce the capitalist mode of production. 
The change in economic and social structure during the rise of capitalism and associated 
market economies has sometimes been described as a change in terms of the extent to 
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which “the economy” is embedded in society. A prime example is the work of Karl Polanyi 
(1957) which argues that such modern market economies should be understood using a 
“formal” economic approach (i.e. individual choice in price-making markets). He regards most 
of human history as having been spent in “primitive” economies, where market exchange was 
largely or totally absent, and distribution occurred via reciprocity and kinship groups (Polanyi, 
1957). Economic (provisioning) activities were described as being embedded in social 
relations and institutions. Understanding such economies required a “substantive” approach 
to economics in contrast to the formal approach, which he accepted as valid only for modern 
economies. The latter are governed by rational logic, efficiency, self-interest and prices which 
he believes means they can be regarded as disembedded from social relations (Gemici 2008; 
Polanyi, 1957). 
 
While Polanyi highlights aspects of institutional differences between capitalist market 
economies and past economies, the division he draws between socially embedded primitive 
economies and socially disembedded modern economies is erroneous and only serves to 
reify the utopia of the “self-regulating market” that he painfully attempted to deconstruct 
(Spash, 2019; Gemici, 2015). The notion of (dis-)embeddedness fails to capture the changing 
qualities of social provisioning, and ultimately denies their social aspects. This encourages 
the separation of the social and economic, rather than their conceptual distinction and actual 
connection. Modern market economies are instituted differently than their historical 
counterparts, but market relations remain embedded-in, and built upon networks of social 
relations (Granovetter, 1985).  
 
Indeed, the reproduction of capitalism and price-making markets depends upon various social 
mechanisms. Capitalism is embedded-in, and the functioning of markets requires, very 
specific social institutions that include well-defined private property rights guaranteed by a 
legal system, judiciary and State authority. As noted by Polanyi (1957[1944]), Nature and 
labour are “fictitious” commodities, since they cannot be produced within the capitalist system, 
but are essential to its reproduction. The formal definition of the economy therefore obscures 
the large range of care and reproductive activities that occur outside of markets, and that are 
generally undertaken by women and has been noted by feminist economics (Spash, 2020). 
Who gets paid and what is not an aspect of efficiently functioning labour markets but 
discriminatory practices involving gender, class and race. 
 
Price-making markets have little, or in fact nothing, in common with perfectly competitive 
markets, where each firm has no power to set prices or control other factors of production. 
Actual market economies evidence oligopoly and monopoly power institutionalised in the 
corporation. Prices are the result of power relations and that includes the power to structure 
markets and regulations in ones own favour. Multi-national corporations and the Davos elite 
do not wait to be regulated; they lobby and influence government action in their favour opting 
for self-regulation when other choices are unavailable. 
 
Power in the market place also means creating demand for products. Large firms have means 
to manipulate social attitudes, and therefore to manage what consumers buy and at what 
price (Galbraith, 1979; Kapp, 1978 [1963]; Spash and Dobernig, 2017). Promotion of 
dissatisfaction is the essence of modern marketing via normalising comparison with others, 
status-seeking (i.e. keeping up with the Jones’s), fashions, in-group/out-group identity, 
shopping as therapeutic and possessing the latest technology. Rather than industrial 
production leading to material satiation, and the need for less work, the consumer society has 
evolved with more work and more disposable products. This process has long been 
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recognised as involving conspicuous consumption (Veblen 1991 [1899]) and manipulation by 
corporate and business enterprises (Galbraith 1969 [1958], 2007 [1967]; Kapp 1963). 
 
 
V. Philosophy of economic science 
 
Mainstream economics has attempted to employ and maintain discredited philosophical 
approaches to conducting itself as a science. On the one hand it aspires to finding objective 
truths through empiricism as if theory was unnecessary and data could speak for themselves. 
On the other it promotes a form of deductivism that places abstract mathematical models at 
its core with unquestionable foundational axioms divorced from any reality. Sometimes the 
two are combined in a pseudo logical empiricist approach,
1
 or claims to some vague form of 
positivism with epistemological positions such as a fact-value dichotomy, a naïve objectivism 
and the search for universal laws (Spash, 2012). None of this has been neutral, but has rather 
hidden an implicit conceptualisation of reality. Thus, the particular worldview of mainstream 
economics has tended to favour regarding economies as physically isolated, mechanical, self-
regulating, equilibrating and predictable systems. Leaving an ontology to be defined by a 
methodology (whether deductivist or empiricist) means falling foul of the epistemic fallacy. 
That is, objects and their relationships only become accepted as valid, or even recognisable 
as relevant, if they conform to the methodology, e.g. if something cannot be measured it is 
ignored, effectively not existing in the analytical approach. Thus mainstream economics is 
blinkered by its methodological choices and methods (e.g. cost-benefit analysis) come to 
dictate understanding of reality (e.g. Nature must have a monetary price to be of value). In 
addition, contrary to the approaches of mainstream economists, the second half of the 20
th
 
Century saw a general recognition that science operates in a social context, and that our 
knowledge is fallible. However, the failings of mainstream philosophy of science are not the 
primary concern here (see Tacconi, 1998; Lawson, 2006; Spash, 2012, 2020), but rather we 
aim to suggest what would be a way forward in relation to SEE. 
 
Ecological economics emerged as a critique of mainstream’s economics inability to account 
for the complexity of economies, and particularly of its underlying biophysical processes such 
as the Laws of Thermodynamics (Puller and Smith, 2017). However, the field has suffered 
from a misguided commitment to pluralism, or anything goes, that has resulted in claiming 
validity for knowledge claims based on opposing and contradictory assumptions and 
methodologies (Spash, 2012). Notably, the field has struck an uneasy line between criticism 
of mainstream economics and adoption of its methods and models, which has been justified 
as being pragmatic (Spash, 2013). The resulting confusion has left the field with a weak 





The search for philosophical foundations led Tacconi (1998) to propose a combination of 
post-normal science and constructionism. However, in its strong form constructionism denies 
realism and is incompatible with the ontological commitments of ecological economists to a 
biophysical reality independent of the human mind. Post-normal science is also not a 
                                                     
1
 Logical empiricism, originating within the Vienna Circle, was a diverse philosophy of science with 
diverging opinions among the members of the Circle (see Spash, 2012).  
2
 The concept of passive revolution originates from the Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci and relates to 
the passive integration of counter-hegemonic elements by various means (often small concessions) to 
neutralise their revolutionary potential and leave the overall power structure unchanged. For an 
extended discussion on this topic in the context of ecological economics see Spash (2021a). 
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philosophy of science, but an epistemological critique of traditional naïve objectivism in the 
natural sciences and its transference into the social sciences. As Tacconi (1998) seems to 
recognise his mixture of inconsistent approaches results in contradictions. Puller and Smith 
(2017: 19) summarise the problem as follows: 
 
“Ecological economists seem to be searching for a way to combine a 
perception of the world as independent of our knowledge, while at the same 
time admitting the social construction of knowledge and the role of meaning-
making in the social realm”  
 
They then detail how a philosophical well-grounded approach can be found in critical realism, 
which combines ontological realism with epistemic relativism. 
 
The form of critical realism of relevance here is associated with the early works of Roy 
Bhaskar (1975 [2008], 1979). As explored by Lawson (1997) in relation to economics, a 
strong emphasis is placed on the importance of addressing ontological issues. More 
specifically critical realism propose a depth ontology that goes beyond empiricist and actualist 
philosophies to give place to structure and the causal powers of their mechanisms. Structures 
and mechanisms make events happen. What is actualised is merely part of the potential and 
the result of which mechanisms and counter mechanisms are operative and which ones 
dominate. The empirically observable is then merely a subset of what is actualised based on 
human ability to take events into account. 
 
 While social structures are human constructs they are no less real for that. Capitalism is, for 
example, a recognisable system with real mechanisms and effects (as described earlier).  
Reality is further conceived as stratified, with hierarchically ordered strata, starting from a 
physical dimension, followed by chemical, biological, social and economic dimensions (Collier 
1994b). All biological entities are physical, but physical structure is independent of biological 
structure. Similarly, the co-dependent social and economic strata are dependent upon the 
biological, the chemical and physical, but not vice versa. However, as consistent with the 
earlier discussion, higher strata are irreducible to lower from which they are emergent. 
Similarly, Georgescu-Roegen (2009[1979]) exemplifies such properties by considering how 
an elephant is composed of physical and biological structure but its behaviour (an emergent 
property) cannot be explained purely form physics or chemistry. As we have noted society is 
not simply the aggregation of the individuals of which it is composed. 
 
This stratified and layered understanding of reality also results in a concept of causality that 
differs from traditional realist approaches. Instead of being explicable as event regularity, 
critical realism explains actualised events using the concept of causal powers of mechanisms 
based on structures and mechanisms (Collier 1994a). In open systems, there are multiple 
mechanisms at play that can either enable or prevent the actualisation of potentialities. Rather 
than seeking universal and timeless “laws” of Nature there are law like conditions where 
certain tendencies of mechanisms become actualized (Puller and Smith, 2017). 
 
Bhaskar describes the scientific process as “the social production of knowledge by means of 
knowledge” (Collier, 1994a: 54). In this view, “transitive” knowledge or thought objects, 
provide the concepts, models and theories that are simultaneously the raw material and the 
product of science, and which seek to explain “intransitive” reality or real objects (Sayer, 
2010). Science seeks descriptive and explanatory knowledge if natural and social entities, 
phenomena, events and their relationships. While social structure is subject to change it is not 
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so easily or quickly, it has durability (Lawson, 2006), and that means the same transitive / 
intransitive approach to understanding knowledge can be applied. Those who emphasise 
change as undermining all knowledge (e.g. Goddard, Kallis and Norgaard, 2019) fail to allow 
for durable structure and mechanisms which are the essence of the ability to know anything. 
There is also a tendency to over play the role of social scientists in affecting their objects of 
study. 
 
As Sayer (2010: 33) states “social scientists and historians produce interpretations of objects, 
but do not generally produce the objects themselves”. He argues that a clear distinction is 
required between an object of inquiry and our knowledge of it, which consists in the language, 
concepts or images that we use to describe reality. Thought objects are therefore referents to 
their “real” counterparts, but he regards knowledge of true correspondence as impossible, i.e. 
all knowledge is fallible.  
 
Experience of the external world consists of ideas (percepts, sense data, qualia) involving 
socially contextual conceptualisation (e.g. language, culture, prior knowledge). The extension 
of knowledge involves reconceptualization and involves the role of metaphors and analogies 
which relate to existing ways of thinking e.g. the current prevalence of computing metaphors 
and analogies. The transitive or thought object in critical realism involves weak 
constructionism and is termed epistemic relativity or (sometimes) epistemological relativism. 
This weak constructionism contrast with the radical relativism of strong constructionism where 
knowledge is simply a matter of shared conventions among researchers. In such accounts the 
relation to real structures, mechanisms and objects is regarded as irrelevant or even the 
existence of a reality beyond the human mind is denied.  
 
Although knowledge is fallible, it is not equally so. Choices can be and are made between 
difference explanations and descriptions. Representations of the world are of practical use 
and their employment in our actions and practices has consequences which can be 
evaluated, help us navigate it and enable us to have an impact on it. We judge what works 
well and what does not. In Sayer’s (2010: 48) terms intersubjectively shared conventions 
must prove themselves to be practically adequate, so that our expectations about the world 
and results of our actions are actually realised. This is more than just the usefulness of a 
theory, because the adequacy of knowledge is also judge in terms of descriptive realism 
relative to the structure of reality. Thus critical realism is distinct from instrumentalism (such 
as found in American Pragmatism) because the aim is not simply prediction but causal 
explanation. Prediction can be equated with explanation only if one assumes event regularity, 
which fails to hold in open systems like economies. Indeed, prediction is unnecessary for the 
explanation of a phenomenon (Collier, 1994a).  
 
Investigation of open systems requires a distinct approach from the idealised laboratory 
experiment which tries to create a partially isolated system through controlling mechanisms. 
The limited applicability of such methods for social phenomenon means alternative methods 
are typically required, such as the use of counterfactuals. However, as Danemark et al. 
(2002b) point out, there is no specific “method of critical realism”. Indeed the method for 
investigation is relative to the object of study and research question. Critical realism also 
recognises a wider range of modes of inference than the traditional induction and deduction.  
It includes the roles of retroduction and abduction (see Danermark et al., 2002a), as forming 
part of the process of providing causal explanation, which opens up the methodological 
toolbox of social sciences and changes understanding of methodology as supposedly (but not 
actually) conducted in traditional sciences. An inference always implies a form of 
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generalisation and can either refer to extrapolation in an empiricist sense or to 
conceptualisation of the “hidden essence of things” in a realist sense. Danemark et al. 
(2002a: 100) suggest five strategies that can help us discern the hidden underlying structures 
and mechanisms: (1) counterfactual thinking; (2) social experiments; (3) studies of 
pathological cases; (4) studies of extreme cases and (5) comparative studies. 
 
There are also grounds for judging which methods are appropriate. Methods and related 
theories must be adequate to their objects of study (Puller and Smith, 2017; Spash, 2012). 
For example, evolutionary theory, and its associated tools for analysis, is inadequate for 
understanding the operation of a mechanical clock. Thus, Hodgson’s (2008) argument that 
evolutionary theory should replace mechanistic theory in economics is flawed because it 
simply repeats the same mistaken belief that all objects of relevance to economic must be of 
one form (i.e. evolutionary rather than mechanical). Similarly the imposition of mathematical 
formalism as defining economics fails not because the methods is inherently wrong but 
because it cannot address the object of study, i.e. the characteristics of economic systems. 
More specifically quantifying everything with arithmomorphic concepts excludes all qualitative 
aspects (Georgescu-Roegen, 2009[1979]). This indicates the need for a structured 
methodological pluralism, where theories and methods are informed by the qualities of the 
object under study and cooperation occurs between those with common understanding 
(Spash, 2012). 
 
A final aspect of note is the emancipatory role of social science research. Investigating the 
real (structural) cause(s) of a social phenomenon means the explanation of the social 
scientist will inevitably clash with the existing ideas of some people, that is new evidence may 
appear, theories brought into question, previously confirmed positions be undermined. Such 
is the nature of scientific research. Social scientists criticise those holding fallacious ideas. If 
there are institutions holding those false ideas then the research is also a criticism of them 
and the social scientists has a role in removing wrong beliefs. Collier (1994a) argues the role 
of the social scientist is not just to criticize but should be to undermine institutions promoting 
false ideas.  Emancipation is then seen as transforming structure. When considering 
environmental research the case being made here is clear because research showing beliefs 
about the benefits of economic growth, fossil fuels, chemicals, plastic, asbestos, genetic 
modification and so on, to be false then criticise the institutions promoting such things. 
Research is neither neutral nor value free and facts have ethical implications for both the 





The multiple social, ecological and economic crises of our age, and the failings of mainstream 
economics to explain or address the structural causes of these crises, means new 
approaches to economics are essential. SEE has been outlined here as a necessary and 
emerging paradigm. Economics has become increasingly detached from its object of study 
and the orthodoxy is fundamentally flawed as a social science because it advocates a 
prescriptive methodology while lacking any serious engagement with epistemology and 
ontology.  The resulting epistemic fallacy means it promotes a narrow implicit world view as if 
a factual truth.  Failures here include imposition of limited quantitative methods and 
mathematically formalist methodology that exclude qualitative aspects of reality and the use 
of isolated/closed systems thinking for an open system reality. 
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Economies are the socially structured institutional process involving the interaction of humans 
with the natural world. Social reproduction is achieved only within the bounds of the given 
structure and mechanisms of biophysical reality. The form and scale of economic processes 
depends upon a set of spatially and temporally contextual social institutions. That is 
economics concerns the form and function of social provisioning process which can take 
various forms and are far from limited to price-making market or capitalist institutions. Starting 
from processes of social provisioning, economics becomes the study of plural historical, 
actual and potential economies with their underlying institutional arrangements and 
biophysical basis rather than a singular abstract idealised “economy”. This broadens analysis 
not only to what institutions, norms and values shape the economic process and agents’ 
behaviours, but also to what are socially desirable and ecologically sustainable systems of 
social provisioning. Economics is neither value free nor ethically neutral but its stance on both 
should be made explicit. It must also be realist about how economies are reproduced via 
social and ecological mechanisms.  That means linking to both power relations and ethical 
and just means of provisioning, but also material and energy throughput that respects others 
(human and non-human). The aspirations of economists to provide for the well-being of 
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